

# 中国 | 非洲

## China – Africa Relations 2013

Annual Report



CENTRE FOR  
CHINESE  
STUDIES

STELLENBOSCH · SOUTH AFRICA



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# 编辑 Editorial

Dear Reader,

Looking back at the year at times reveals common themes across our varied research strands. In 2013, one of the overarching features in our research was exploring the diversity of China. This annual report contains pictures of various parts of China—and it hopefully includes a few surprising or unusual images. We study China in all its parts, and while we often focus on the political and economic core in Beijing and Shanghai, we also explore Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Western China.

2013 was the year that marked the 15th anniversary of South Africa's relations with mainland China, which was occasion enough for us to look into South Africa's way of navigating the 'One China' policy. The day we launched our report in Cape Town, in fact, saw the 'defecting' of The Gambia as one of the last four African countries from relations with Taiwan.

China-Africa relations are certainly gaining in diversity. Ten years ago, who would have thought that we discuss China's involvement in renewable energy generation in Africa? Yet, we did, in December 2013. Also in Stellenbosch, in April 2013, we debated Chinese involvement in security in Africa. The topics with regard to China and its relations with the African continent seem to continue multiplying over time.

Having made its entry almost a decade ago—2014 will mark our 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary—the CCS is less concerned with making a splash in the debate and is rather turning its attention more to its role in the quality and sustainability of China research on the African continent. What seems like an endless task in terms of actors, new developments, and ever increasing variety is, in fact, a very rewarding research topic—and one that impacts on the economic and social development on the African continent.



Dr. Sven Grimm  
Director

Alongside our work on consistently improving the quality and relevance of our research, it is encouraging that we have had more requests from African governments and government bodies for research input into strategy and discussion on how to better engage with Chinese enterprises or the Chinese government for the development of the continent. Often overlooked in research, there is African agency in the engagement with the world, including East Asia. This agency requires information in order to be fostered, and that's part of our role as the CCS.

When we research contemporary China and its relations with Africa, we should not forget the historical dimension—nor should we forget that China, albeit a giant, is operating in an Asian context. Comparison with other Asian actors or the engagement of other emerging economies is thus useful and provides additional insights. This is a task for the CCS for the years to come.

When looking through this report, I hope that you gain an overview of the terrific job that the CCS staff did in 2013. It hopefully also gives you a taste for the topic and its relevance! We enjoy working as a team and are looking forward to engaging with partners globally on this exciting research task.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Sven Grimm". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.



Prof. Johan Hattingh  
Dean Faculty of Arts  
and Social Sciences  
Stellenbosch University

## *Dear Reader,*

When you are holding this report on 2013 in your hands, the Centre for Chinese Studies will be in its 10<sup>th</sup> year of existence. For ten years, the CCS – as a research centre of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of Stellenbosch University – has worked on creating a broader understanding of China, its rapidly changing role in the world, and specifically in Africa. Since its existence, and with new vigour over the last years, the CCS has engaged with a large number of decision makers across Africa and in China, has contributed to the academic debate on China and China-Africa relations in a number of topical areas, and has, overall, anchored research on East Asia within our Faculty and in Stellenbosch University. This truly is a research unit to be proud of.

It is somewhat surprising that the CCS is still the only Centre of its kind on the continent, ten years after its foundation. This cannot be related to the need for research on China on the African continent; China is becoming ever more present in and relevant for Africa. It rather might have to do with challenges of the research environment on the African continent, not least so with regard to adequate funding as an eternal challenge to all endeavours of research. The ‘value’ of research, including, not least so, research of social sciences is often difficult to put into Rand, Dollars or Euros. These social sciences contributions are not only “*l’art pour l’art*”, not art for the sake of art, but also make a contribution to political processes that help to overcome entrenched poverty by making use of global opportunities when they present themselves. Contributing to increasing mutual understanding thus is no small contribution. By acknowledging and comprehending different drivers of policies, in fact, this applied side of social sciences contributes to make policies more adequate and more effective in addressing social challenges. In that regard, research publications by the CCS are practical pieces of work. In fact, the CCS has created formats to fulfil this specific role of policy advice, not least so its series of policy briefings that help with gaining a quick grasp of debates and that provide recommendations.

In addition to the policy contribution of social sciences, working on China-Africa relations, however, also has a long-term value in itself in academia. Institutions like the CCS are resources of knowledge for specific questions as much as for an understanding of context and background. You, as a reader of this report, will notice that the CCS publication output has increased substantially, both in terms of quantity, but also with regard to quality of publications. Even though predominantly conducting a research agenda, the CCS has a role in the University’s training of post-graduate students; as a reference point, as resource, and as a location for intellectual stimulation and for raising curiosity of future generations of decision-makers in this country, on this continent, and beyond. I am aware that CCS staff engages in our teaching activities within and outside Stellenbosch University and in addition contributes to its research agenda; this exchange between research and teaching can only be enriching and foster our position as an institution of excellence in higher education and research.

The CCS’ audience is truly global – and publications like the journal *African East-Asian Affairs* is clearly adding to Stellenbosch’s social sciences reputation around the world. From the website data, we know that the CCS’ readership is geographically very diverse. The Centre’s work finds its audience in

# 欢迎的单词 Words of Welcome

the Western Cape setting as much as in Gauteng; in Beijing, Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Shanghai as well as in London, Washington or Nairobi. Building on its local, national and international networks in the creation of academic publications and the organisation of conferences, the CCS has further gained stature in 2013.

This stature is a necessary step towards the sustainability of the CCS' work as an institution. Only with a sound academic track record – like it has – can an institution be recognised as a competent partner for research. With its work, the CCS has contributed to making Stellenbosch University, the Western Cape and the South African academic landscape internationally visible.

This annual report reflects some of the substantive work done by the CCS, which includes overviews of development in China-Africa relations in 2013, as well as examples of commentaries published on the CCS website. The report is also informing on the academic output of the CCS. It is a visually attractive and substantive business card of the Centre. The work presented is the result of researchers' commitment to quality work and fruit of their substantial input into our institution. I would like to thank the CCS team for its work in 2013 and I hope you enjoy reading through this publication. I am very much looking forward to the anniversary year 2014.

Best regards,



# Political Relations



# *African agency in the relations with Beijing*

**2013 saw a new government in China, with Xi Jinping acceding to Presidency and Li Keqiang assuming premiership. The tasks for the new Chinese administration are vast. A major issue to grapple with for all emerging powers is the balance between pressing domestic issues – predominantly: economic growth and job creation – and expectations to shoulder global responsibilities.**

The change of the guard in Beijing saw a rather nationalistic approach by China in East Asia, which more aggressively emphasised territorial claims in the South Chinese Sea and in waters off the East Chinese coast, not least so with a flurry of tensions over the Diaoyu Islands that Japan claims as Senkaku Islands, yet was increasingly critical towards Pyongyang's maverick behaviour. This could have been a reaction to increased pressure on the CPC's domestic legitimacy, not least so coming from an increasing middle class in China, outraged by corruption and inefficiencies in the state apparatus. The Chinese government reacted to with a campaign against lush spending and corruption. Not least so the handling of the trial against former CPC Big Whig and mayor of Chongqing, Bo Xilai, as well as other high-level cases was an internal challenges for the first year of Xi Jinping as President of the People's Republic. Most cases ended with severe sentences, often effectively life imprisonment. Domestically, the new administration of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang announced far reaching economic reforms in November 2013, including a relaxation of the One-Child policy, new regulations for the finance sector, greater land rights to farmers, reforms with regard to State-Owned Enterprises' performance and more space for private enterprises. These internal reforms will have effects on China's economic engagement with the rest of the world, including Africa (see

contribution by Daouda Cissé and Yejoo Kim), and political tensions or the easing thereof in Asia has implications for African countries' engagement with the various parts of 'One China'.

Every new administration in China needs a specific slogan, not unlike new administrations elsewhere, that inspire at least the administration and offers some orientation. These slogans are often not much different from what we know from some Western style election campaigns. For former president Hu Jintao, it was the "scientific path to development" and China's "peaceful development". Xi Jinping's arrival at the helm of the state has the "Chinese dream" as a new slogan, and this comes with increasing attempts to also project a slogan abroad. This is also an attempt to project soft power abroad; it remains to be seen how appealing this charm offensive is to African leaders and their respective electorate.

With regard to China-Africa relations, 2013 was a year marked by continuous debate on the political dimension of this relationship. Consistently over the last years, much attention has been given to China's economic involvement on the continent and this has been accompanied with bullish speculation as to China functioning increasingly as a neo-colonial power in Africa, competing with the West for influence. In this debate, 2013 seems to have been a year of a rather more assertive Africa, with – at times sharp – critical re-

# Political Relations



marks by people such as Botswana's President Ian Khama or Nigerian Central Bank Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi over China's role and activities in Africa. In a similar thrust, the Ghanaian government took action against illegal gold miners from China, with numerous arrests and deportations and one casualty during policy action. In academia, aid dependent African governments are usually discussed as having little strategic planning capacity (or political will) to manage intervening external agendas. More African agency and more strategic engagement from Africa's side is called for – and, consequently, has also had an impact on the demand for policy advice from the CCS in 2013. African agency should be understood as the ability to wilfully determine and pursue one's own priorities, including the ability to reject external ide-

as. Somewhat randomly, The Gambia exercised this pursuit of its own agenda by cutting ties with Taiwan in November 2013, leaving Taipei with only three African allies. This move by Banjul, however, seems to have been unilateral, and is somewhat of an unexpected blow to Cross-Straight relations in East Asia, met with a conspicuous absence of a public reaction from Beijing.

Within the broader spectrum of China's political relations with African countries, the issue of China's "non-interference" policy was hotly debated at a CCS conference on China-Africa relations from a security perspective in April 2013. There is a sense, particularly amongst western scholars, that as China's involvement within the continent grows, this policy will ring increas-

ingly hollow. In fact, even within Chinese policy circles, there are debates to adopt alternative terms, such as the more positive “creative involvement”. What many of the presentations illustrated was a hitherto relatively modest influence upon the continent. For instance, with regards to political risk, many participants were surprised to discover - given the entrepreneurial spirit of contemporary China - that there is a dearth of political risk firms within the country; the bulk of that task is (insufficiently) delegated either to in-house departments within State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or to the Ministry of Finance and Commerce. China’s perceived gung-ho approach to political risk has frequently been commented upon, with huge investments in very risk-prone regions such as the Sudan and the DRC.

China was learning some particularly hard and fast lessons in the Sudan, where its oil ventures were, until recently, operating in the middle of a full-blown civil war, located directly upon the fault-line of what is today “the two Sudans”. Chinese workers in Sudan have been abducted in 2008 and 2012, and Chinese companies had to deplore casualties amongst their oil workers. Much of China’s economic growth is dependent on oil (see contribution by Harrie Esterhuysen), and domestic production did not even cover half the demand in 2012. The outbreak of internal fighting in South Sudan in December 2013 is thus likely to raise concerns in Beijing create initiatives at the highest level of the Chinese diplomacy. Chinese companies are becoming, like their competitors, more risk averse, increasingly drawing on the models of western firms. In the years to come, it is anticipated that China will increasingly draw on pre-existing western models as well as developing its own home-grown political risk industry.

One possible strategy to cushion against global political risk and to discuss mutual expectations is a multilateral approach to global politics. From a Chinese perspective, the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), is one element in the engagement with various groups of states; the mechanisms in these groupings remain fundamentally bilateral and any action requires consensus. The first BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa – overall the fifth such meeting of the BRICS – went ahead in March 2013. The BRICS countries symbolise the global shifts towards ‘aspiring many’ in developing countries, even if the global middle class is not exclusively to be found in this self-declared group of five ‘emerging economies’. While emerging economies demand an increasing say in global policies, the question remains about their common agenda. When looking at development goals (the MDGs or other) and the issue of sustainability, what is the message of these emerging countries? The Durban summit offered few specific answers, including on the envisaged BRICS Development Bank, which, given the vast differences in specific interests amongst the BRICS nations, probably did not come as a major surprise.

China-Africa relations are becoming increasingly symptomatic for the fundamental change that global politics are undergoing. China is but one example for these tensions between various domestic and international agendas, even though it is the biggest player amongst the emerging powers.

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**Sven Grimm**  
*Director*



# Political Relations

## *Shifting Chinese Attitudes toward Risk and Security*

**On a recent trip to China, which I spent attempting to grasp some of the country's security concerns in relation to its growing presence in Africa, I was confronted how broad and complex the debate is. In conferences and meetings, conversations quickly shifted from multi-lateral peace initiatives, where China engaged in military co-ordination with the African Union, to the height of walls surrounding embassy compounds; from small traders' deployment of local African security guards, to methods of deterring elephant poaching in Kenya.**

This array of topics reflects the nebulous and expanding nature of security debates more globally - so much so that issues of maintaining peace between states is now quaintly referred to as "traditional". Adding to the list of things which should be protected, we now include ("non-traditional") concerns such as water, air, vegetation, fauna, energy, food and, not least of all, people themselves. Of course, the latter is inextricably linked to the more old-fashioned understanding of security - one only need look at how, say, Chinese oil exploration in Sudan is inextricably bound up with the greater geopolitical stability of the region. If there is anything which unites these disparate themes, it is that China is increasingly becoming what Ulrich Beck referred to as "risk society", namely embracing "a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself". The rise of this security discourse is inevitably tied up with China's shift toward capitalism.

While China has a torturous history of embracing modernity within the twentieth Century, much of this was in the vein of socialist central planning, where, in episodes such as The Great Leap Forward, millions were sacrificed on the altar of modernity. Mao was once quoted as saying: "It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat their fill". Certain elements re-

garding Chinese attitudes to risk have changed since the rise of a market economy: one is that industries - even state owned ones - now function as profit-making enterprises and must factor risk into the calculus of profit. In the early 2000s, Chinese investors in regions such as Africa demonstrated an attitude toward risk which would make most western companies shudder. State Owned Enterprises, with virtual non-conditional backing from state coffers, engaged in some incredibly chancy investments. Nevertheless, political turmoil in countries such as the Sudan, where Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and others had significant investments, offered China a sobering lesson in gung-ho investment. Academics and bankers now contribute to the burgeoning field of Chinese political risk assessment. A recent interview with a former high-level official from the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference saw him calling for the establishment of a Chinese version of Blackwater - the American security company outsourced by the US government in its adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Despite China's troublesome human rights record, the rise of the middle class has been accompanied with a growing concern for individual rights and security. An important catalyst has

been the Chinese blogosphere, where commentators on sites such as Weibo persistently highlight threats posed to individual citizens (i.e. the farmer deprived of his land by local officials; the mother forced into abortion). These individual cases are reflective of greater social insecurity and pose a daily challenge for the Communist leadership. Such mechanisms have also put more pressure on the Chinese government to protect its citizens abroad, as can be witnessed in the recent case of Libya, where the government airlifted some 35 000 Chinese from the country as civil war raged. What is interesting in this regard is to what degree changing Chinese perceptions of security are limited to Chinese citizens and to what degree this extends toward other people within the countries from which these citizens are being evacuated. A narrow direction which human security abroad might take is one which is essentially nationalist and only concerned with one (in this case, Chinese) form of human life. This can take many forms including a kind of “enclave” capitalism in which people from a particular country or corporation are virtually immunized from local life within hyper-securitized spaces (seen, for instance, in certain oil and gas installations). More disturbingly, it can take the shape of what was witnessed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where western powers swiftly evacuated their own nationals and abandoned any responsibility to protect millions of Tutsis and Hutu moderates.

All of which leads to the much broader question of how, in the coming years, China will engage itself in regional African security. Certainly, China’s massive investments on the continent - another effect of its market reforms - have obliged it to have a greater say in African political affairs. This stems not only from the fact that it has people and assets to protect but

also that African states and traditional European powers expect of China a greater responsibility in governance and securing peace. And as with powerful nations such as the UK, the US and Britain, such involvement has domestic implications in which citizens will question why resources should be used fighting other countries’ wars. The unfolding events in Mali, in which China has pledged military support to ECOWAS but has also been overshadowed by France’s dramatic military intervention, suggests that at present China has put its toes in the water but has not jumped off the deep end yet, so to speak.

The economist Karl Polanyi once argued that as, what he termed, the “Market Society” spread to different parts of the world, it uprooted local, embedded forms of trade and forced them into the greater global grid of a competitive capitalist society. In a similar vein, we might say that something similar has occurred within China with regards to security and risk. The country’s market expansion and “going out” policy have obliged it, at a number of different scales, to adopt more “normative” approaches security. Thus, if anything links the disparate conversations around security in China today, it is none other than the discourse of “security” itself, which will continue to permeate the consciousness of Chinese, ranging from holidaymakers to decision-makers. For better or for worse, Africa will increasingly become a site for this mode of thinking.

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**Ross Anthony**  
*Research Fellow*



# Economic Cooperation



# *China and Africa: Shifting gears and new challenges*

**Even though China has not enjoyed as substantial growth as in the last three decades, its economic performance still remains remarkable at the domestic as well as global level. Initially, its open-door policy to the rest of the world for investments and trade had developed China's economic relations with the world. Now, China has become one of the most significant political economic actors in the world, and its development trajectory has been regarded as a new model for some other developing countries, including African countries. However, there is little room for complacency with the past performance in China. In its current stage of development, China faces reforms that are hoped to result in a more balanced economy in which a range of internal problems need to be addressed.**

Towards the end of Hu Jintao's term as China's president, new economic reforms have been announced in order to sustain the country's economic growth which for the first time after three decades started to decelerate. Such reforms remain important for Xi Jinping whose government faces social, economic and environmental challenges that are all linked to the current economic growth model of China, which is resource intensive and often inefficient. While sustaining economic growth is high on the Chinese government's agenda, green growth which takes into account environmental sustainability is more crucial for China today (see contribution by Harrie Esterhuysen). Economically, China aims at boosting domestic consumption, which is done in a twofold strategy: on the one hand, reforms aim at facilitating imports and local production, and on the other hand tried to foster the growing Chinese middle class with a relatively high purchasing power. A slowing down of export production in China holds risks for African countries which provide much of the primary products for Chinese factories – and some analysts see slower Chinese demand for commodities as a reason for weak-

ening currencies, not least so the South African rand's slump in 2013. The changes, if strategically engaged with from the African side, however, also hold new opportunities.

While the Chinese government carefully orchestrates these internal challenges, it will continue to engage with the outside world. China's quest and need for natural resources will especially be one of the motivations for its overseas investments. China's rapidly growing economy has resulted in the need to secure energy resources for stable development in the future. In this regard, Africa's importance to China's overseas investment agenda would remain significant. In addition to this, seeking business opportunities abroad related to accessing growing markets and testing companies' expertise to operate in a foreign environment on the one hand drives Chinese private companies to operate in Africa and on the other hand it is partly linked to the lack of credit and loans which are more directed to state-owned enterprises and big multi-national companies to develop businesses in China and the increasing costs of labour and production. Those aspects based on

# Economic Co-operation

delocalisation mainly drive companies to relocate to mostly neighbouring countries in South-East Asia, but also to Africa. This trend offers opportunities for the manufacturing sector in Africa. For instance, Chinese glass and shoe producers have established themselves in Ethiopia, while in South Africa, automobile production and manufacturing of household appliances has been established by Chinese companies. Through delocalisation, Chinese companies contribute to develop the manufacturing sector which ultimately could enable African countries diversify their exports that are still heavily based on primary goods. This would also create opportunities for resource-poor countries to attract Chinese investment in the manufacturing or the service sectors. Chinese investment has already diversified and expanded its scope into tourism, telecommunication and banking sectors.

In this context, it should be noted that Chinese private companies' engagement in Africa has been increasing. China's overseas investments used to be channelled through Chinese state-owned enterprises, but the growing number of private multinational companies and small and medium-sized enterprises is noteworthy. In terms of value, state-owned enterprises still have importance, but private-owned enterprises have been increasing. A working paper published by the World Bank in 2013 claimed that 55 per cent of all African investment projects were now driven by private enterprises. However, managing the growing presence of Chinese private businesses is a challenge to both Chinese and African countries when it comes to norms and standards of production, illegal activities, environmental sustainability, informal trade and--above all--migration. The major concern of growing private enterprises is related to environmental degradation and human rights of the labour force in host countries. Also, concern was raised concerning local government offi-

cially who close their eyes to illegal Chinese engagement, ranging from illegal immigration to the violation of employment regulations (see contribution by Sven Grimm).

Many have criticised the Chinese enterprises' lack of transparency on their actions and the norms they work towards, including China's global players in a number of economic sectors. The importance of corporate social responsibility is one matter of which the Chinese government is aware and has tried to rectify shortcomings and malpractice through its state-owned enterprises by developing investments policies and guidelines around environmental sustainability.

China's remarkable growth has been watched by many African leaders and aspiration is often to replicate the growth. The establishment of special economic zones, for example, is based on the successful experience of China and reflects the aspiration of African countries. However, the current development of SEZs in Africa tells a different story. Differences exist among host countries in terms of economic framework conditions and a Chinese success does not automatically become a success in, say, Ethiopia, Mauritius or elsewhere. The mechanisms in where SEZs were instrumental in overcoming shortcomings in the Chinese setting have to be studied more carefully – and any African SEZ will have to deliver solutions for shortcomings in the respective African context it is to be successful.

Often enough, Chinese engagement in Africa has been the primary focus. Yet, several African enterprises have also tried to expand their footprints in China. Even though these enterprises are mainly South African players in sectors such as brewery, media and finance, based on the most sophisticated, broad-based industrial sector on the continent, their success stories could provide good examples of how to penetrate the important Chinese market and materialise opportunities for sectors with specific African ad-



vantages. For these opportunities to materialise, however, African stakeholders need an overarching strategy. While political relations with China can bring about some quick-win economic gains without a sophisticated, coherent policy, it would not be easy to take advantage of economic opportunities that lie in a relationship with China for African economies.

Furthermore, there are other emerging partners looking for opportunities with African countries. At an early stage of the relationship between China and Africa, China might have appeared as having unique characteristics in its economic engagement; however, it seems that Chinese stakeholders have substantial commonalities with other investors, be they from India, Malaysia, South Korea or Brazil. Bearing this in mind, whether it is Chinese investment

or not: only if well managed, with suitable, regularly adjusted regulations and their implementation in different African countries can investments ensure job creation, technology and skills transfer.

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**Daouda Cissé**  
*Research Fellow*



**Yejoon Kim**  
*Research Analyst*



# Economic Cooperation

## *China's involvement in resource extraction in Africa: the South African case*

**China's increasing presence in Africa has mixed reactions from analyst, policy makers and the public in general. The discussion so far has tended towards broad geo-political concerns and nonspecific speculations about neo-colonialism. China's hunger for Africa's resources is massive, in order to sustain its current economic growth rates, China has to access these resources. On the other hand, Africa needs Chinese investment in order to address its massive infrastructure deficit, which has been severely damaged by civil wars and neglect.**

The China has become an economic factor to reckon with: in 2011, China became Africa's largest individual trading partner, with trade rising from US\$ 129.6 billion in 2010 to US\$ 160 billion in 2011. However, in many instances African leaders have failed to leverage their natural resources (which include oil, precious metals, copper, coal, platinum, diamonds, uranium and cobalt and so on) to promote Africa's economic development and growth.

While China's human rights record, environment and business practices in Africa have never been exceptionally good or transparent, China's dealings in Africa, are, for the most part within the "law" of the environment created by African leadership. There is a general feeling that African political elites, when engaging with China, have opted for short-term gain over long-term development for their countries, which, in some cases has obvious repercussions on law enforcement. This tendency has enabled Chinese firms to extract Africa's resources with limited accountability to Africa's political, economic, environmental and social structures.

Through infrastructure-for-resources loans, China has enabled its national enterprises to operate globally. And, it is imperative to point

out, that it has also made a substantial contribution towards the provision of roads, railways, ports and other infrastructure needed across the continent. These infrastructure programmes have improved the transport system of these African countries, and this has created a conducive environment for business, thus indirectly contributing towards poverty reduction. Questions about quality might persist but quickly fall square back onto those bodies responsible for oversight in African countries.

In terms of trade and investment China uses financing methods which range from export credits to supporting national exporters. These financing methods include the "Angola Model" (where China Exim Bank uses natural resources exports as collateral for infrastructure projects as a way to repay loans), and mixed credits (a mixture of foreign direct investment and export credits).

The China-South Africa relationship has grown significantly since the early 1990s. It is imperative to examine how South Africa has benefited from this relationship. South Africa is the leading producer of platinum and manganese. South Africa and China signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2010

that prioritised working towards a more balanced trade profile between the two countries, in particular by encouraging trade in manufactured value-added products. South Africa also possesses a number of minerals and precious metals, such as iron ore, diamonds, gold and it is the only country in Africa to invest in China. In 2008, South Africa's exports stood at approximately US\$ 3.5 billion. According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), South Africa's exports to China reached an all-time high of R85 billion in 2011, an increase of 45 per cent over 2010.

It is important to note that China's mining investments in South Africa are noticeably different from investments in other African countries. Chinese companies have been establishing joint ventures with South African mining companies that are profitable and stable, so as to ensure a long-term supply of raw materials to the Chinese market. There are five examples of these joint ventures, namely: i) Zijin (China) and Aquarius Platinum (SA), ii) Minmetals Development Company (China) and Palabora Mining Company (SA), iii) Jiuquan Iron and Steel Corporation (China) and International Ferro Metals (SA), which owns the Buffelsfontein chromite mine and smelter in the North West, iv) Sinosteel Co. and Samancor (SA), v) East Asia Metals (China) and Limpopo Economic Development Enterprise. The latter is the largest joint venture operation involving a Chinese company, and it is operating as ASA Metals, at the Dilokong Chrome mine. The project is mining 400 000 tonnes of chrome ore per annum, and producing 120 000 tons per annum of ferrochrome from an on-site smelter. In this partnership, East Asia Metals owns 60 per cent of ASA Metals. These joint ventures certainly have created jobs and led to value addition.

The South African government, through legislation such as the Mining Charter, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment and Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act has been

calling for mineral beneficiation and for more transformation in the mining industry. Transformation is meant to ensure that historically disadvantaged South Africans benefit more from South Africa's mineral wealth. These policies, coupled with complex environmental and labour laws have required a very distinct way of engagement for Chinese corporations operating in South Africa, which has to consider development of communities alongside economic benefits. Considering development an important angle in the debate, analysis still needs to be done on where this policy framework is attracting Chinese investments and where it is not.

The South African mining industry – still the economic backbone of the country – can certainly make a positive contribution towards job creation, thereby reduce poverty and contribute to the development of communities. One of the crucial conditions for South Africa to benefit more from these economic partnerships, is a need to improve the capacity of implementing agencies (such as Department of Mineral Resources), prudent management of mineral rent (quick win vs. long-term vision), building human and institutional capacity, promoting research and development, and a leadership that has a long-term view about these matters. China needs to go beyond the elites and engage with all the stakeholders (including mining communities) in a more constructive way.

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**Tobela Tapula**  
*Research Analyst*



# Environmental Aspects



# *China and the environment: turning a green leaf or disappearing in the smog?*

**China has seen rapid and sustained economic growth over the last two decades. However in recent years the detrimental effect that China's rapid growth has had on its environment has become more evident. As the world community continues to look for ways to combat climate change on a global scale with the important target date of 2020 only seven years away, China is faced by severe pollution affecting its soil, water and air. In the past the Chinese government has been blamed for paying mainly lip service to the problems of pollution. As the visibility of the pollution problem becomes all the more central in the public mind the government will however be wise to start acting. China's environmental agencies need to be given more teeth, with clear guidelines on what is acceptable environmental practice and what is not, with proper monitoring, and, ultimately, with polluters punished. The pollution problem in China simply cannot be changed or overcome if government does not act systematically on their own acknowledgment that sustainable development is no longer a possible strategy but rather a necessity. In November 2013, during the second plenum of the 18th party congress (for more on the plenum see contribution by Sven Grimm), the Chinese Communist Party was issuing the high goal of an "ecological civilisation" - however there is still a (very long) way to go.**

The high levels of pollution in China are having detrimental effects that have real economic cost implications for the country. China often experiences severe air pollution, especially in the North, where coal power is used to generate electricity for heating in winter. By December 2013, air pollution in some Chinese cities had once more reached "airpocalypse" levels. Airpocalypse is the word used by Chinese media to describe the yearly spells of smog that choke Northern regions during cold spells. People's Daily, mouth piece of the Chinese Communist Party published an article on "the five surprising benefits of smog", according to which, smog protects Chinese cities because it covers ground targets from enemy fire, it brings people together because everyone hates smog and it creates equality, because rich and poor

suffer from it in the same way... Many people will choke on laughter about this (infelicitous satirical) piece. It is however estimated that outdoor air pollution caused over 1.2 million premature deaths already in 2010. It has also been estimated that life expectancy in Northern China has been reduced by as much as five and a half years due to the an increased risk of cancer, strokes and heart disease due to pollution. Pollution is also said to have cost the Chinese economy US\$ 100 billion in 2009 from increased health care costs and as a result of lost wages. That means that China lost more than 3 per cent of its GDP in 2009 to pollution, a number that is likely to have increased substantially since. It is possible to argue in favour of coal, China does for example need a base energy supply, something that renewable energy cannot

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provide yet; coal is also a current “very cheap” source of power (if one foolishly ignores future costs and other opportunity costs). However, increasingly one has to ask whether the loss of millions of lives can be ignored for the sake of economic growth or for “suffering in equality”?

China’s economy is affected by many unsustainable practices such as the increased usage of coal (in volume) for energy, weak regulations on waste disposal and wide spread corruption that allows the well-connected to bypass existing environmental regulations (see contribution by Daouda Cissé and Yejoo Kim). If current trends continue, the Chinese economy will reach a point where the costs of pollution and rapid growth swallow the gains from the economic growth - hence the political attention at highest level. One area in which China has to make vast improvement is in energy efficiency. Although China’s energy efficiency has improved and continues to improve, it still lacks far behind many of its competitors. According to a World Bank report of 2013, China’s PPP GDP US\$ per kg of oil equivalent in 2011 was 4.1, very low compared to countries such as Germany at 10.4 in 2011. Lower energy usage per unit of GDP means that it is cheaper for a country to produce items of a certain value, thus sustainable practices directly convert into higher profits. Or, simply put, China cannot be competitive if it does not become more energy efficient.

In addition to health-, human- and productivity costs, the future cost of cleaning up China is also increasing. The current costs to GDP, if history is anything to go by, will most likely pale in comparison to the costs future generations of Chinese tax payers will have to bare to clean China up. Once a certain level of affluence has been reached citizens have been shown to demand cleaner and healthier surroundings. Contrastingly though, an increase in affluence in China has also had a negative effect on environ-

mental protection in Africa (to name but one region). With more disposable income in China, the demand for Ivory has seen a dramatic increase. Ivory has long been a status symbol in China. The increased demand has been linked to the poaching of tens of thousands of African elephants for their tusks. Although China has a legal national ivory market, (strangely) partially satisfied through extinct mammoth tusk imports from Russia, it nonetheless adheres to the international ban on the international trade in ivory (from which mammoth tusks are exempt due to the mammoths already being dead). The Chinese government has increasingly been seen to take a stronger stance against the illegal ivory trade, signing several memorandums of understanding with African states and it seems as if this resolve has been hardening throughout 2013. The nature of the trade in China, legal and illegal, however causes difficulties in monitoring the trade and enforcing the ban on illegal (indistinguishable from legal) ivory.

With China’s own national problems of unsustainable development and pollution, renewable energy and the promotion of the renewable energy, both within China and also for the international export market, is seen as a possibility that will allow China to begin addressing many of its current environmental ills. Renewable energy promotion and its increased use in China will allow for the combining of technological developments with economic growth, including environmental sustainability. Renewable energy can help China to move its economy up the value chain and to produce “cleaner” products whilst also employing its growing pool of highly qualified graduates. Higher end products, their production and their development, are essential in the Chinese government’s plan of creating what the government calls “a moderately prosperous society”. The government has begun to promote the next step in development of the Chinese economy through



the stated desire to establish an “ecological civilisation”. The idea of the ecological civilisation is to establish a China in which humans live in harmony with nature, “harmonious development” (in other words: sustainable development). In addition to the environmental and social benefits derived from “harmony with nature”, China also stands to benefit economically with lower health care costs and increased efficiency. It will also, if successful, be able to establish itself as a profitable leader in renewable energies, being at the forefront of renewable energy development.

Achieving provincial adherence of national policies have always been a problem in China, arguably even a crippling problem in the case of the environment and adherence now will be a

hard bargain. Possibly with the right combination of determined leadership, stronger environmental agencies and increased weighting of environmental indicators in promotions (times have changed and this might actually work the second time around), who knows - maybe 2014 is the year in which China finally turns over a new (green) leaf.

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**Harrie Esterhuysen**  
*Research Analyst*



# Environmental Aspects

## *China's Dream: Economic success but environmental failure*

**Early this year, Chinese President Xi Jinping began promoting the “China Dream” as a slogan, leading to its widespread use in the Chinese media. President Xi has described the China Dream as “national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society and military strengthening” (CRI English, 17 March 2013). With the recent initiation of the China Dream concept, there has been an increased focus on promoting the idea to the world. How appealing, however, is the Chinese dream from an environmental perspective?**

Some Chinese government officials have been quoted in media reports saying, “China dream will benefit Asia and the world while opening up new opportunities for other countries to realise their own dreams or visions” (China Daily, 4 June 2013). During a visit to Tanzania, President Xi in speaking about China’s policy to Africa, spoke about “a community of shared destinies” and “the two sides should endeavour to realise the Chinese and African dreams” (All Africa, 2 April 2013). Also, “with China and Africa both yearning for development, the China dream of national renewal is intimately tied up with the African dream of self-reliance and development” (China Daily, 31 March 2013). Promoting the idea of the China dream in this way, could be understood as China trying to influence other countries to follow their path and the way they do things.

### **China and the environment**

In the last three decades, China has developed its economy at rapid speed. During this time, China has industrialised, urbanised and increased its agriculture practices at great levels. Not only that, but China has also had to endure

a high population growth, with population numbers now at 1.3 billion. The socio-economic development is impressive, indeed!

However, due to all these factors, the impacts have been enormous on the environment. Many of China’s plant and wildlife species have been listed on the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species. A prime example of this is the popular and well-known panda species. In the early 1990s, China had cleared many forest areas because of the increased domestic demand for forest products. This had a major impact on the wildlife living in the forests including the Panda, many were unable to find food and shelter, almost leading to the extinction of the species. In 1998, China issued a logging ban (Chuanxi forest area 1998), in order to protect and grow its own forests, as well as protect the remaining Panda species (which has led to major imports of timber from Africa and elsewhere – and questions on the sustainability of this practice in Africa).

This grim picture of a not-so-green China does not inspire as the one of the US does. Images of China during much of the year do not look appealing because of heavy pollution. Every winter, pollution becomes a serious health hazard in major Chinese cities and a danger to society, with pollution levels from the smog that even decrease visibility. This has enormous impacts in the way that foreigners view China. News reports showed that China's pollution levels were 30 times higher than levels deemed safe by the World Health Organisation. This aspect of China's growth is not inspiring to other countries – and pollution levels thus negatively impact on China's "soft power", or its force of attraction.

### **The greening of the West**

The dominant image of the Western world at the moment is more advanced than China in terms of environmental protection. Although the West has long been developed, most countries have also been taking care of their natural environment for a long time. When it became known in the 1960s and 1970s that rapid economic development was having phenomenal impacts on the environment and ecosystems, many of the world's countries came together to change the way things were done. The growing number of threatened biodiversity led to an increase in the number of protected areas, be it in the form of botanical gardens, nature and wildlife reserves, historical sites and national parks. The US was the first country to establish a national park in the form of Yellowstone National Park in 1872. Yellowstone has been a model park for most national parks in the USA and around the world (followed by the Krugerpark in South Africa in the early 20th century, actually).

Although first established for leisure, protected areas are now managed mainly for ecosystem protection, education and recreation. Protected areas ensure that biodiversity may be protected without human threats (including development

activities). Later on in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, apart from a few countries, the majority of the world's parkland was created. It was in this period, that the importance and protection of the environment became more significant and prevalent for the global community.

Rapid economic growth and development may be very appealing to African countries desperate to build their own economies and industrialise their own nations in order to curb many of the socio-economic issues plaguing the continent, but are African countries really willing to give up their blue skies, environment and beautiful landscapes to the degree that China has - irreversibly? Develop now and suffer the fate of long term, or worse-case, irreversible environmental damage? If the Chinese government wants to inspire other countries to also dream their dream, then they need to improve on the environmental record, improving the way in which the environment and development activities are connected. Their skies need to be clearer, their water needs to be drinkable and they need to improve protection of their environment and wildlife.

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**Meryl Burgess**  
*Research Analyst*





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## *Visiting Scholars in 2013*

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Law School of Xiamen University  
and International Economic Law  
Institute of Xiamen University  
*China*



**JIANG Hengkun**

Institute of African Studies of  
Zhejiang Normal University  
*China*



**Chedza Mogae**

Phandulwazi nge China: Scholar  
*Botswana*



**ZHU Ming**

Shanghai Institutes for  
International Studies  
*China*



## *Interns 2013*

**Karina Legradi**  
*USA*



**Connie Louw**  
*Namibia*



**Mphumeleli Ndlangisa**  
*South Africa*



**Gerda du Toit**  
*South Africa*



# AFRICAN EAST-ASIAN AFFAIRS

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### **African East-Asian Affairs Issue 01, 2013**

Special issue on  
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## African East-Asian Affairs Issue 03, 2013

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**Zhou Hang**

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tions

**Thomas J Wheeler**

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## African East-Asian Affairs Issue 04, 2013

**Steven C. Y. Kuo**

Chinese Peacebuilding in Liberia as soft-  
power projection: perspectives from  
Monrovia

**Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh**

Sino-Nigeria investments: prospects and  
challenges 1971-2010

**Liu Yang, Cyprian Nugah Doh**

China and Botswana: legal and cultural  
differences in labour laws

FORUM:

**Daouda Cissé**

China's engagement in Africa: opportuni-  
ties and challenges for Africa

## The China Monitor: The BRICS summit 2013 - Is the road from Durban leading into Africa?

05 March 2013 (Issue 75)

After having joined the club for 2012, South Africa is going to host the annual summit of heads of state of the BRICS in late March 2013. In the light of South Africa's foreign policy – if not just for being the African BRICS member state – it is consequential to have chosen Africa's development as the overarching topic for this summit. The Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University focusses particularly on China-Africa relations and explores China's growing role in the world. Africa is no small feature in China's foreign policy and its economic strategy. This special edition has the purpose to provide background on the various African agendas of the BRICS members in order to inform decision-makers and the broader public on the background of deliberations held in Durban. The discussion we want to provide input to with this publication clearly is not the somewhat futile debate about whether South Africa fits within the BRICS or not; it now is a member state and discussion should rather focus on what South Africa can achieve and which agenda it should promote. The question we asked our authors for this publication was how the other BRICS see the continent and how do their respective agendas fit with Chinese (and South African) foreign policy goals when it comes to Africa.

## Special Issue



## *Journal articles and book chapters*

**Anthony, Ross:** 'Infrastructure and influence: China's presence on the coast of East Africa', *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, Vol. 9, Issue 2.

**Anthony, Ross:** China's Global Role in the East African Oil and Gas Bonanza. In: Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe & Liu Hongwu (eds). *China-Africa Relations – Governance Peace and Security*. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (Addis Ababa University) and Institute of African Studies (Zhejiang Normal University). pp. 114-128.

**Cissé, Daouda:** South-South Migration and Sino-African Small Traders: A Comparative Study of Chinese in Senegal and Africans. *China African Review of Economics and Finance*, 5, 2013 (1).

**Grimm, Sven:** Aid dependency as a limitation to national development policy? The case of Rwanda. In: Harman, Sophie & Brown, William (2013) (eds): *African Agency in International Politics*. Routledge. pp. 81-96.

**Grimm, Sven** and **Burgess, Meryl:** "Greening Chinese-African Relations?" In: Xing, Li and Osman, Farah (eds). *China-Africa relations in an era of great transitions*. Ashgate. pp. 71-85.

**Kim, Yejoo:** Chinese Investment and African Peace and Security: The Case of Ethiopia. In: Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe & Liu Hongwu (eds). *China-Africa Relations – Governance Peace and Security*. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (Addis Ababa University) and Institute of African Studies (Zhejiang Normal University). pp. 181-195.

**Li, Wanxin., Grimm, Sven** and **Esterhuysen, Harrie:** China–Africa Cooperation: Joint Engagement in Adaptation to Climate Change. In: Ruppel, Oliver / Roschmann, Christian / Ruppel-Schlichting, Katharina (eds.): *Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance, Volume II: Policy, Diplomacy and Governance in a Changing Environment*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 529-547.

**Maurin, Cristelle** and **Yeophantong, Pichamon:** Going Global Responsibility? China's strategies towards "sustainable" overseas investments. In: *Pacific Affairs*, 86 (3): 281-303.



# 刊物 Publications



## *Discussion Papers*

**Yejoon Kim:** Chinese-led SEZs in Africa: are they a driving force of China's soft power? CCS Discussion Paper, 1/2013, February 2013.

**Emma Scott:** China goes global in Egypt: a special economic zone in Suez. CCS Discussion Paper, 2/2013, August 2013.

**Gerda Du Toit:** Political risk factors: what Chinese companies need to assess when investing in Africa. CCS Discussion Paper, 3/2013, September 2013.

**Meibo HUANG and Peiqiang REN:** A Study on the employment effect of Chinese investment in South Africa. CCS Discussion Paper, 4/2013, October 2013.

**Frank Youngman:** Strengthening Africa-China relations: a perspective from Botswana. CCS Discussion Paper, 5/2013, November 2013.

## *CCS Policy Briefings*

**Yejoon Kim:** Chinese-led Special Economic Zones in Africa: problems on the road to success. CCS Policy Briefing, No 1, March 2013.

**Cristelle Maurin:** Strategic partnerships and sustainable investments: How can China support the African Mining Vision? CCS Policy Briefing, No 2, May 2013.

**Daouda Cissé:** South-South migration and trade: African traders in China. CCS Policy Briefing, No. 3, June 2013.

**Daouda Cissé:** South-South migration and trade: Chinese traders in Senegal. CCS Policy Briefing, No. 4, June 2013.

**Sven Grimm and Elizabeth Schickerling:** The China-African Development Fund (CADFund) as a sovereign wealth fund for Africa's development? CCS Policy Briefing, No. 5, July 2013

**Ross Anthony and Sven Grimm:** 'Chinese engagement in African security - pragmatism and shifts', CCS Policy Briefing, No. 6, September 2013.

**Ross Anthony, Sven Grimm and Yejoon Kim:** "South Africa's relations with China and Taiwan: Economic realism and the 'One China' doctrine", CCS Policy Briefing, No. 7, November 2013

**Harrie Esterhuysen:** The Chinese solar energy industry and potential of renewables in Africa, CCS Policy Briefing, No. 8, December 2013.

## Other publications

**Ross Anthony:** 'China's role in South Sudan's peace and security', in: Saferworld, UK. Oil, security and community engagement - A collection of essays on China's growing role in South Sudan.

**Ross Anthony and Daouda Cissé:** 'Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa: entrepreneurs or the long arm of the state?', Ivey Business Journal, London/Ontario.

**Ross Anthony:** 'Review: "A global security triangle: European, African and Asian interaction" by Valeria Bellow and Belachew Gebrewold (eds.)', H-Soz-u-Kult.

**Daouda Cissé:** Des infrastructures « made in China » en Afrique: une contribution au développement?, In: Revue Mensuelle ICSTD Geneva, Passerelles.

**Daouda Cissé:** Chinese private enterprises in Africa: investment motives and challenges for Africa, China Daily Newspaper (Africa edition).

**Daouda Cissé:** A Portrait of Chinese Traders in Dakar, Senegal, Migration Information Source, Migration : Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

**Daouda Cissé:** Does China meet infrastructure building norms and priorities in Africa? Contribution to Goethe University-Africa's Asian Options (AFRASO) research blog. Frankfurt/ Germany.

**Yeजू Kim and Karina Legradi:** Policy recommendations for existing and potential SEZs in South Africa. India: SEZ World Tracker, July 2013.

**Sven Grimm and Christine Hackenesch:** "Building a nest for the Phoenix?" - Rwanda's strategic engagement with China. Background Study for the Rwandan Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance (MINECOFIN), August 2013 (manuscript; Government of Rwanda).

**Sven Grimm:** South Africa: BRICS Member and Development Partner in Africa. Global Review (Shanghai, SIFS), Spring 2013, pp. 27-31.

**Sven Grimm and Nuša Tukić:** Country profiles for World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)- USA. The profiles discuss Chinese investment and sustainability in: DRC, Ghana, Gabon, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia) (manuscript, WWF-USA)



### Chinese language classes now available at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa



African Union diplomats now have the opportunity to learn Mandarin at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This initiative comes from a joint Confucius Institute-Chinese Embassy effort to further China-Africa relations via language instruction and cultural exchange at the highest level, reports the [People's Daily](#) (China). The move was warmly received by African diplomats. Reikia Mahamadou, acting head of Administration and Human Resources Management at the AU, commended the initiative at its opening ceremony and is optimistic that its objectives will be met, according to [AllAfrica.com](#) (International).

### China to assist South Sudan in mining industry



China will help South Sudan develop its mining sector and is in talks to lend the country between US\$ 1 billion and US\$ 2 billion for road, power and agriculture projects. China has also provided an additional US\$ 43 million for a geological study to assist South Sudan in mapping its underground resources such as gold, reports [Business Day](#) (South Africa). China has sought to bolster ties with South Sudan where it has significant investments in the oil industry going back to the time before the country's secession from Khartoum in 2011, according to [Reuters](#) (UK).

### Nigeria and China sign agreement to fund major power project



Nigeria and China signed an agreement to construct the Zungeru Hydroelectric Power Project at a cost of approximately US\$ 1.3 billion, jointly financed by China's Eximbank and the Nigerian Federal Government. The contract will be executed by a consortium of two Chinese companies namely China National Electric and Engineering Corporation and SinoHydro, according to the [Times of Nigeria](#) (Nigeria). The deal will help lessen the chronic electrical power supply shortages that continues to hamper Nigeria's economic activities, reports [Ventures](#) (Africa).

### West-African iron ore market tied-up through Chinese sales deals and infrastructure



China is tying up the supply of iron ore in West Africa through sales deals and associated infrastructure rather than acquisitions. The type of Chinese firms looking to invest in West African iron ore is also changing, with interest coming from railway and construction firms and import companies, rather than heavyweight mining state-owned enterprises, reports [Reuters](#) (UK). This follows analysts' predictions that the steel price will rebound in November and December. Analysts have warned that in the long run it is unlikely that there will be large-scale purchase orders of iron ore, according to [China Daily](#) (China).

### Kenya signs infrastructure and energy deals worth US\$5 billion with China



Kenya signed deals worth US\$ 5 billion with China to construct a standard gauge railway line and an energy project. The railway, linking the port of Mombasa to Malaba, is meant to provide faster access from Kenya's port to markets in the region, reports [Reuters](#) (UK). Under the agreement, Chinese state corporation, Dongfang Electric International, will also put up a solar farm within the Rift Valley region in order to boost the country's power supply. The project is expected to generate 50 MW of power to be fed into the country's national energy grid, according to [CRI](#) (China).

### China National Petroleum Corp to purchase stake in Angolan oil field



The China National Petroleum Corporation, China's main oil refiner, has concluded a deal with the US-based Marathon Oil Corp to purchase its 10 per cent stake in an Angolan oil field. The site will be managed by Sinopec's subsidiary Sinopec International Ltd., according to the [China Daily](#) (China). CNPC bought the site, in Block 31 of Angola's offshore oil deposits, for US \$ 1.52 billion. CNPC has recently been more aggressive in pushing for deals throughout the world as oil is key to China's future energy security and continued growth, reports [Reuters](#) (International).

### Namibia and China sign a US\$ 25 million co-operation deal



China has donated US\$ 25 million to Namibia for the development of infrastructure and education projects in the country. During the signing ceremony, Chinese Ambassador to Namibia, Xin Shunkang, said his government is ready to share its experience in social and economic development with Namibia in its quest to realise Vision 2030, according to [New Era](#) (Namibia). The Namibian government has expressed its gratitude and hopes of boosting its economy by having more Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country, according to [Xinhua](#) (China).

### BRICS reach deal on development bank to rival the IMF and World Bank



The world's leading emerging powers, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, have reached a deal to create a development bank that will in theory rival Western-dominated institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, reports [Tribune India](#). It is still unclear where the new bank will be based or when it will open. An official told Dow Jones that ministers would likely recommend a maximum initial contribution of \$10bn each from the five countries, according to the British [Telegraph](#).

# The Weekly Briefing 每周简报



The **Weekly China Briefing** is compiled by the Centre for Chinese Studies and informs subscribers (free of charge) about China business news with a special focus on Chinese trade and investment activity on the African continent.

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# 会议 Conferences



## ***Managing Security and Risk in China-Africa Relations Conference hosted by the Centre for Chinese Studies***

***Lanzerac Wine Estate, Stellenbosch, South Africa,  
25 to 26 April 2013***

As China's economic expansion continues, its role in global international affairs has become more prominent. One example is Africa, where Chinese trade and investment have grown exponentially in the last decade. This presence on the continent has implications regarding peace and security, both

within Africa but also globally. The conference dealt with issues of security ranging from the practical nuts and bolts of investment and the risk involved in such ventures but also the broader picture of China's role in regional and global security architectures. Guiding the conversation was the premise that China's "going out" strategy has been accompanied with a growing awareness of risk aversion coupled with obligations to play a greater role in peace and security on the continent. Thus the gathering discussed the following questions: How are Chinese notions of risk changing on the continent? How do questions of security at the level of individual economic enterprises (both private and state-owned) feed into larger political questions of stability? As the geo-political situation changes, what are some of features which characterize this shifting terrain on the continent? And, what kinds of forecasts can be made with regards to this changing role in Africa?



# Conferences 会议

***International Symposium - China in Africa***  
***University of Denver, USA,***  
***01 February 2013***



The Centre for Chinese Studies co-hosted this conference Chinese engagement in Africa, with the Center for China-US Cooperation at the University of Denver and the Carter Center in Atlanta. China's growing influence in Africa is a topic that triggers controversial debates in the United States. Speakers at the conference included Ambassador David Shinn, former US ambassador to Ethiopia; and Major General Zhu Chenghu, National Defence University of China.

***A High-level Chinese/Southern African Roundtable Dialogue on Renewable Energy: Charting the way forward***  
***Asara Wine Estate, Stellenbosch, South Africa***  
***05 to 06 December 2013***

The roundtable presented a unique opportunity to draw on the participation of approximately 35 high-level stakeholders from China and Southern Africa that included representatives from government departments, state-owned companies, private enterprises, academia and civil society groups. The roundtable critically discussed the role of renewable energy as a pathway to improved energy access and energy security in Southern Africa; and in addition how it can act as an incentive for industrial development; as well as the role of China in supporting both the roll-out of renewable energy and Southern African developmental outcomes.

The objective of the workshop was to develop a policy and development road map to guide and inform future co-operation between Chinese and Southern African actors in renewable energy.



## *Selected presentations by CCS staff*

**Daouda Cissé:** Lecture on Economic and Technological Development Zones at a seminar organized by the UNDP China office and the IPRCC for delegates from African countries, Beijing/ China, **16-22 January 2013.**

**Daouda Cissé:** South-South trade and migration: Chinese traders in Africa (Senegal) and African traders in China (Yiwu) presented at Point Sud and GIGA Conference, sponsored by the German Research Foundation, Dakar/ Senegal, **20-25 January 2013.**

**Ross Anthony:** 'State and society in China', Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University, **19 March 2013**

**Sven Grimm:** An Overview of Current Africa-China Research within Africa, presented at the workshop: Developing Research Agenda on Botswana-Africa-China Issues. Gaborone, University of Botswana, **18-19 April 2013**

**Ross Anthony:** 'Chinese Aesthetics' talk for Exhibition 'Consider China', Art-space, Durban, **22 April 2013**

**Daouda Cissé and Sven Grimm:** Chinese Investments, Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability Norms. Presented at: International Workshop on "The Role of Companies from Emerging Economies in Global\_Norm-Building on Sustainability", organized by the Goethe-Universität Frankfurt in cooperation\_with GIGA. German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg, **24-25 May 2013.**

**Sven Grimm:** China-Africa Cooperation: Promises, Practice and Prospects. Presentation at: China in Africa – An International Symposium, Macau/China, **25 June 2013.**

# Presentations 简报

**Ross Anthony and Meryl Burgess:** 'Exporting the Chinese Dream: domestic implementation and foreign challenges' for the conference, "Chinese Dream, African Dream: Achieving Common Development through Joint Efforts", University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania", **15-16 July 2013**

**Daouda Cissé:** South-South trade and migration: Chinese traders in Africa (Senegal) and African traders in China (Yiwu) presented at Goethe University (AFRASO Lecture Series), Frankfurt/ Germany, **13 June 2013**.

**Sven Grimm and Christine Hackenesch:** Rwanda's strategic engagement with China. Workshop at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance (MINECOFIN), Kigali, Rwanda, **22 July 2013**.

**Sven Grimm:** Striving for development, living up to responsibilities - Managing South Africa-China relations in the 21st century, South Africa-China Diplomatic Relations at 15 Years; Ambassadorial Forum at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Pretoria, **19 September 2013**.

**Meryl Burgess:** Sustainability in China-Africa relations; Presentation to China Africa Symposium: Fifty Years of China-Africa Cooperation: Background, Progress & Significance –African Perspectives on China-Africa Relations and the China Development Experience, Harare, Zimbabwe, **22-24 October 2013**.

**Nuša Tukić:** Chinese engagement in Africa's extractive industries: Examples from the mining and forestry sectors - Presentation at: Climate Change and Water Trans-disciplinary Forum 2013. Stellenbosch University, **28 November 2013**

**Harrie W. Esterhuysen:** An African view of Chinese renewable energy companies and their relevance to Africa - Chinese/Southern African Roundtable Dialogue on Renewable Energy: Charting the way forward. Stellenbosch, **04 December 2013**.

# 讲座 Lectures

## **China Forum -**

### **Chinese political and economic engagement in Liberia**

Luke Hurst

*30 September 2013*

Iron ore from West and Central Africa has the potential to meet much of the demand by China. But political and institutional instability, corruption and a lack of technical capacity pose major hurdles to this outlook. During this roundtable discussion, initial observations of China's political and economic engagement in Liberia will be outlined with a focus on the development prospects for Liberia's iron ore sector. Observations were drawn from fieldwork done with-in Liberia's National Investment Commission.

## **China Forum -**

### **Traditional Culture of Tibet: life in Tibet as a part of China**

Luorong Zhandui and Zha Luo

*18 September 2013*

A lecture and discussion session on the topic of traditional Tibetan culture in a modern China, presented by two Tibetan scholars. The lecture also included an historic overview of China-Tibet relations.



**Seminar: 'China in Africa'**

Ross Anthony

31 January 2013 - UCT Centre for Open Learning, Cape Town University.

**Lecture: 'South Africa in a global BRICS context'**

Harrie Esterhuysen

March 2013 - International Office, Stellenbosch University.

**Seminar: 'Cultural dimensions of doing business in China'**

Ross Anthony

15 May 2013 - Rhodes Business School, Rhodes University.

**Seminar: 'China's growing presence in Africa'**

Ross Anthony

16 May 2013 - Rhodes Management School, Rhodes University.

**Honours class series: 'China/Africa energy and environment co-operation'**

Harrie Esterhuysen

August 2013 – Department of Sociology, Rhodes University

**Lecture: 'Democracy in China'**

Harrie Esterhuysen

August 2013 – Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University.

**Honours Course (2 semesters): 'History of Modern China'**

Ross Anthony

23 October 2012 - Department for Modern Foreign Languages, Stellenbosch University.

**Lecture: A comparative analysis of Chinese investments in Gabon and Mozambique's forestry sector**

Nuša Tukić

24 October 2013 - Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), University of the Western Cape.

## CCS Media Coverage

### - Selective

“SA businesses should strengthen competitiveness to survive in BRICS: expert”

– Shanghai Daily, China

*23 January 2013*

“China’s Xi Jinping to Visit Congo and Tanzania: Charm and Business Set New African Course”

– International Business Times

*23 March 2013*

“World Dream,’ Business on Chinese President’s First Overseas Trip”

– International Herald Tribune, USA

*24 March 2013*

“Afrika först för Kinas nya ledare”

– Sveriges Radio, Sweden

*25 March 2013*

“Brics need to deal with the emerging middle class and look beyond”

– BusinessDay, South Africa

*26 March 2013*

“Should China Keep its ‘Africa Dreams’ to Itself?” – The Diplomat

*03 April 2013*

“BRICS Summit 2013 to Launch Business Council” – CNBC, South Africa

*April 2013*

“China: ‘rogue’ donor or beacon of south-south co-operation?” – The Guardian, UK

*02 April 2013*

“Made in China – Afrikas mulighet Energi Debatten” – VG, Norway

*12 April 2013*

“Working with Chinese contractors”

– The Guardian, UK

*17 May 2013*

“China-Africa Trade Pumps in Billions”

– CNBC, South Africa

*20 June 2013*

“Foreign degrees grow in popularity”

– China Daily, China

*21 June 2013*

“U.S trying to ‘play catch-up’ with China’s strong presence in Africa: expert”

– People’s Daily, China

*26 June 2013*

“Obama ‘playing catch up,’ as Africa looks to China” – CNN, USA

*26 June 2013*

“China one of many in the scramble for African oil” – China Dialogue, China

*03 July 2013*

“Shifting production overseas brings problems for Chinese companies”

– China Dialogue, China

*11 August 2013*

# Media 媒体

“China is not a threat to Africa’s growth: scholar” – The Citizen

*14 August 2013*

“African presence part of globalization” – China Daily, China

*23 August 2013*

“China’s involvement in resource extraction in Africa: the South African case” – The Trade Beat

*27 August 2013*

“Conversation with Dr. Sven Grimm (格文)” – The Africa Daily

*05 October 2013*

“CCS study on the employment effect of Chinese investment in RSA” – Polity, South Africa

*November 2013*

“La Gambie rompt ses relations diplomatiques avec Taiwan” – RFI, France

*16 November 2013*

“Greatest depth comes from the south” – China Daily Africa

*22 November 2013*

“And then there were three: China’s spending power entices Taiwanese ally” – Forbes, USA

*November 2013*

“Interview on Nelson Mandela” – Voice of America (Chinese service), USA

*December 2013*

“South Africa’s relations with China and Taiwan: Economic realism and the ‘One China’ doctrine (December 2013)” – Polity, South Africa

*December 2013*



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## CCS Commentaries

*02 January 2013, Meryl Burgess: 'Not in My Back Yard'!  
The growing NIMBY protests in China*

*07 January 2013, Sven Grimm: Task for Beijing in 2013*

*14 January 2013, Daniel Krahl: Africa story - from the  
Yellow river to the Nile*

*28 January 2013, Ross Anthony: Shifting Chinese Atti-  
tudes toward Risk and Security*

*11 February 2013, Daouda Cissé: Hauwei needs to press  
reset*

*18 February 2013, Meryl Burgess: Beijing smog – an an-  
nual affair*

*25 February 2013, Ross Anthony: Chinese cyber espio-  
nage and the United States*

*03 March 2013, Sven Grimm: BRICS and Beyond*

*18 March 2013, Yejoo Kim: Reform or get stuck: China's  
new leadership and its arduous tasks*

*25 March 2013, Daouda Cissé: The invisible face of Chi-  
na's economic development – the mingong*

*02 April 2013, Robert Attwell: China and Hong Kong -  
One Nation Lots of Protests*

*08 April 2013, Sven Grimm and Yoon Park: The Chinese  
conspiracy... – or intellectual laziness?*

*07 May 2013, Harrie Esterhuysen: China tops global in-  
vestment in green energy - Is it all clean now?*

*13 May 2013, Ross Anthony: Reflections on, 'Managing  
Security and Risk in China-Africa Relations' a conference  
held by the CCS, April 2013*

*22 May 2013, Daouda Cissé: China's footprint in Africa's  
infrastructure building sector: Contribution to develop-  
ment?*

*27 May 2013, Ross Anthony: Chinese hands... Not dirty  
enough?*

*03 June 2013, Derica Lambrechts: Chinese syndicates and  
poaching in South Africa: the case of abalone*

*10 June 2013, Yejoo Kim: Chinese workers in Africa: Risk-  
ing more, and hoping to earn more*

*19 June 2013, Kgothatso Moloi-Siga: The adventures of  
Laowai*



19 June 2013, Sven Grimm: Studying in China – A career option for African students?

25 June 2013, Karina Legradi: Regional African organisations as negotiation partners with China

01 July 2013, Harrie Esterhuysen: Solar panel beating a way for Africa to stimulate manufacturing

09 July 2013, Daouda Cissé: Does China meet infrastructure building norms and priorities in Africa?

30 July 2013, Nuša Tukić: Traditional Chinese medicine vs. rhino extinction

06 August 2013, Daniel Krahl: Guest Column: Making a fortune? – Chinese gambling in Africa

12 August 2013, Sven Grimm: The Chinese dream... – and how you can't hurry love!

19 August 2013, Daouda Cissé: Doing business in China: what are the challenges?

26 August 2013, Tobela Tapula: China's involvement in resource extraction in Africa: the South African Case

03 September 2013, Yejoon Kim: Towards an innovative society: the experience of China

09 September 2013, Robert Attwell: Changes in Japan's relations with Africa: aid, trade and security

17 September 2013, Meryl Burgess: China's Dream: Economic success but environmental failure

30 September 2013, Tobela Tapula: China to help South Sudan develop mining sector: how can South Africa get involved?

07 October 2013, Xin Xiao: "What if": China and US conflict on the Korean peninsula

14 October 2013, Robert Attwell: China's maritime disputes: Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines find common cause

21 October 2013, Daniel Krahl: Guest Column: The latest victims of the Euro crisis – Chinese grocers in Africa

21 October 2013, Mphumeli Ndlangu: Strengthened ties in Sino-African trade: China to see its first yuan clearing house out of Asia

28 October 2013, Daouda Cissé: Beijing's interests in global financial expansion or the internationalisation of the yuan

04 November 2013, Clarissa Graham: The role of social media in China's anti-graft campaign

11 November 2013, David Benzeraf: China in Africa: towards obscure transparency?

18 November 2013, Sven Grimm, Yejoon Kim: The Gambia defecting from Taiwan – Misunderstanding the "One China" policy?

25 November 2013, Harrie Esterhuysen: Africa and not China nor the "West" is responsible for Africa

02 December 2013, Robert Attwell: China's Air Defence Identification Zone: Domestic Success but International Blunder?

17 December 2013: Two views: Does China have soft power? Yes (Ross Anthony) - No (Sven Grimm)

10 November 2013

CCS COMMENTARY

**The Gambia defecting from Taiwan – Misunderstanding the "One China" policy?**

The Gambia was one of the last four remaining allies of Taiwan on the African continent – until its president, Yahya Jammeh, declared last week that the country would now want to side with Beijing. The Gambia is unlikely to have been "bored" away by Beijing, who have little incentive to be contracting Jammeh to Taiwan to be an often erratic leader, and he might have, this time again, been not well informed. While Beijing at first glance should rejoice about its popularity, and it certainly not the place to tell African states to stick to allegiance with Taipei, this decision of a tiny African state complicates things in Cross-Strait relations. Beijing and Taipei were adhering to an undeclared "truce" of not actively seeking to win-over states' recognition from each other, with Beijing leaving unquestioned Taiwan's relations with four African states and a number of Caribbean and Pacific states, while Taiwan refrained from a "bidding war" with Beijing to gain diplomatic support. The decision, however, sheds new light on the dogma of the "One China" policy. What's behind that policy – and how does it work for African countries?



In Africa, the "One China" policy meant that 50 African states recognise Beijing as the sole representative of China, whereas Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Swaziland and Sao Tomé & Príncipe were the only countries that kept siding with Taiwan. The allegiance, however, is shaky; in fact, Sao Tomé & Príncipe in early 2012 already showed signs of wanting to switch to Beijing (see [CCS commentary](#) by Yejoon Kim of 24 April 2012) – and ultimately did so, despite Chinese business interests in the island state. The real news would be if China established a liaison office in Sao Tomé without trying to gain full diplomatic recognition – on a turf that was left to a Taiwanese embassy. That, in fact, would bring a new dimension to an already extremely pragmatic policy.

**Beijing's calculations in switching sides**

The fact that The Gambia broke ties with Taiwan has little to do with disputes over governance standards – as curiously suggested to us by a journalist. After all, Taiwan has links with Swaziland, which, as Africa's only absolute monarchy, surely is not a beacon of democracy or human rights. Rather, the story behind the change is to do with Beijing's increasing force of attraction – and probably unrealistic hopes for big money coming from Beijing in the future. This might also have to do with the urge to Beijing to tap into existing frameworks for African-Chinese cooperation, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), of which 50 African states are members – and countries siding with Taiwan were not.

While one might smile at President Jammeh's comment of "wanting to remain friends with the people of Taiwan", it is often overlooked that siding with Beijing does not mean cutting off all ties to Taiwan. I would want to vouch for Beijing being important enough to remain of interest to Taipei and Beijing, but even if anything resembling diplomatic recognition is out of bounds, there is economic loyalty – at least for bigger states.

# 期待 Looking Forward

## *2014 – Ten years of Stellenbosch research on China-Africa relations*

The first CCS commentary in 2014 should be an occasion to do some self-reflection and look at the state of research on China in Africa. Ten years ago, the CCS originated from a joint undertaking between the governments of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. It was felt, back then, that more knowledge of China was needed in Africa for a better mutual understanding. The CCS has seen a few changes in the course of its existence: between 2005 and 2009, the Centre also served as a Confucius Institute. Since, our sole vocation has shifted to non-partisan and independent research and analysis of China and China-Africa relations. What remained the same, however, is that the CCS continues to provide an academic platform in Africa for the study of China, and East-Asia more broadly. Here are some examples of an intriguingly more complex research agenda.



China-Africa trade goes from strength to strength. And it also continues to feature structural challenges for Africa's economies. Trade and investment between China and African countries is predominately based on the Chinese quest for commodities, true. Chinese enterprises, however, are also increasingly exploring new markets, thus looking for consumers in Africa rather than 'just' coal or cobalt. The investment – also unthinkable a decade ago – apparently is also driven by Chinese private enterprises, who are responsible for more than half of the projects in Africa. Increasing – albeit still insufficient – efforts are undertaken to increase the adherence to standards and sustainability by Chinese enterprises at home and, more difficult, abroad. Wiggling through loopholes is an entrepreneurial strategy that might be sufficient to get rich quickly; it is, however, not sustainable for the Chinese economy. A hit-and-run strategy of some enterprises does not build brands, but ra-

ther destroys the “brand China” and negatively affects those businesses who mean serious business on the African continent. Public diplomacy is a term often heard in Beijing. But vastly insufficient public communication of enterprises is still one of the weakest points of Chinese engagement.

In a number of aspects, China is still a developing country, indeed. However, this should not result in claiming that it operates at the same level of the average African countries and meets every African partner country at eye-level. The country is complex: China has more than three trillion US dollars as currency reserves, and a three-digit number of absolute poor inhabitants; it has veto power in the UN Security Council, and shockingly limited means to understand international crises; and it is the second biggest economy on the planet with more than one billion inhabitants and consequently massive leverage over eager investors, and it has one of the most disastrous ecological records on the planet. The depths of these contradictions have to be fully grasped by policy-makers in Africa. Policy response to Chinese interests often is to try and bandwagon on Chinese growth with quick-win businesses. Alternatively, others try to also have a

# Looking Forward 期待

special economic zone, just as a status symbol, without being clear on what the purpose of this supposed 'beacon for domestic development' is to be. This ad hoc approach is likely to result in more White Elephants; it certainly has very little to do with learning from each other.

China's global – and hence also: African – political role is undergoing changes. Globally, its non-interference policy has at least two effects. First, it signals pragmatism to the world; the days of Maoist internationalism are over. Secondly, it is appreciated by African politicians who are used to being put under the yoke of foreign interference in their economic policy. Yet, this policy doctrine will have seen its days. When substantial Chinese investment and numerous Chinese citizens are on the ground, it will be hard to sustain a hands-off attitude to African problems. When operating in conflict areas, it is impossible to not become party to the conflict. China is learning hard lessons in South Sudan, where massive Chinese investments in the oil industry are creating pressure on Beijing to contribute to a peaceful solution for this youngest of African countries.

In politics, the rhetorical shifts over a decade have been remarkable: discussions no longer are simply a stormy love affair between African and Chinese leaders. Voices now include challenges put to China by, say, President Ian Khama of Botswana, Nigerian Central Bank Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi or by actions of law enforcement against a large number of illegal Chinese miners in Ghana's gold fields. China's Africa engagement requires more and more coordinated and strategic activities – which need to be based on increasing levels of knowledge of context. Similarly, knowledge on Asia is needed on the African side: One illustration was the defection of The Gambia from Taiwan late last year might. The move might have seemed logical to Banjul; it certainly, however, puzzled policy makers in Beijing concerned with the balance in China-Taiwan relations and was not based on an analysis of the East Asian situation. It is obvious that drivers and actors in Chinese politics need to be understood in or-

der to benefit from opportunities. Being ignorant of domestic political developments in China, one of your biggest trade partners, is just not good enough when long-term development is the goal.

Last, but not least, the inter-personal relations between Chinese and Africans are still superficial and more work needs to be done to create knowledge about the other in African countries and in China. Ten years after the CCS was founded, we are now discussing a sizeable number of Chinese citizens on the African continent. Their number might be around one million people across the continent; the exact number we do not know. The average African still knows little about the difficulty of life in China, often regarded as glitzy as Beijing or Shanghai façades. In China herself, specifically Yiwu and Guangzhou Cities are hubs for an African migration and places like Wuhan or Chongqing see a sizable community of African students, who all have their own stories of encounters with China. And we should consider the truly remarkable exceptions in people-to-people relations, too: We have even seen reports of the first asylum seeker from Africa in the Middle Kingdom, who had to flee his native Zimbabwe as he was prosecuted there based on the love he found in China – because his significant other happens to be male!

Within China-Africa relations it is ever more nonsensical to depict one side as a villain and the other as a victim. For researchers across Africa, the work has just begun: Less rhetoric, more empirical work, please! May the year see more attention to analysis on the continent! We wish you a good start into 2014 and a prosperous year of the Horse in the Chinese zodiac system.

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# 积分 Contact Info

## **Editorial team:**

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